

that there is a "cruel hoax" all right, but it has nothing to do with the President's anti-poverty program. It has to do with the fact that 35 million Americans are not earning enough to meet the basic needs of life—in this the richest nation in the history of the world. And it has to do with the fact that 20 million Negroes are denied equal opportunity—in the Nation that lit the torch of freedom throughout the world.

It is significant that President Johnson's favorite Biblical quotation is from the Book of Isaiah: "Come now, and let us reason together." And this is what he is asking the Nation to do now: to reason together as children of God so that, in the end, all of our citizens can have the opportunity to fulfill their highest ambitions.

These are aims that all of us—Democrats, Republicans, Independents—can support. They are aims that we, as Christians, must support. It is more than a matter of national policy. It is a matter of conscience.

As Catholics, we can take pride in the efforts our church has made to alleviate poverty and to end racial discrimination.

Not only has our church supported programs at every level of government in the field of public welfare, but it has also encouraged its members to give of themselves. In many of our cities, college students have formed tutoring groups to aid children in slums. Retired teachers have volunteered to give their evenings to help the illiterate acquire at least a minimum level of reading and writing. There are settlement houses and neighborhood projects to bring hope and incentive to those who seem to have no future. Halfway houses have been established for former prisoners, to ease their transition into normal community life.

But I think particularly of the leadership the church has given on civil rights. In 1958, the Catholic bishops of the United States said in their statement on discrimination:

"It is a matter of historic fact that segregation in our country has led to oppressive conditions and the denial of basic human rights for the Negro. This is evident in the fundamental fields of education, job opportunity, and housing. Flowing from these areas of neglect and discrimination are problems of health and the sordid train of evils so often associated with the consequent slum conditions."

The Catholic Church was one of the earliest groups to recognize this inherent relationship between discrimination and poverty in the United States and it has been most successful in bringing this relationship before the American public.

But the church has moved far beyond the educational phase of segregation. Now, the byword is action.

The Catholic bishops have stated on three separate occasions that "the settlement of the race problem is for all of us a sacred duty . . . which can be fulfilled only on the basis of justice and in the spirit of charity."

Already the Catholic schools have been integrated in Louisiana, and come next September, they will be integrated in Alabama as well.

Catholic interracial and interfaith councils exist in some 70 archdioceses of the Nation. Working together, the clergy, laity, and press preach Catholic principles of interracial justice through every available medium.

In Maryland—the first State south of the Mason-Dixon line to enact a public accommodations law—Catholic leaders hailed the bill's passage 2 months ago as a "triumph of legislative wisdom."

And in the presidential primaries in Wisconsin, Maryland, and Indiana, the Catholic press has done a magnificent job, reacting swiftly and forcefully against what it has called the "moral evil" of those who were running on a distorted anticivil rights platform.

But in spite of all our progress in the areas of poverty and civil rights, the major tasks lie still ahead. And nothing less than a truly national effort will suffice. We are now in the opening stages of the most massive attack on discrimination and human want in the history of the world. President Johnson has called on all of us to support him in this attack.

Let us give him that support. In the years ahead, let us truly be able to say, "We gave our hearts and our hands to those in need—in the name of Christ."

Thank you.

Antipoverty Bill Runs 47 Pages— Everybody Talks About Johnson Plan but Few Have Read Resolution 10440

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. KATHARINE ST. GEORGE

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 25, 1964

Mrs. ST. GEORGE. Mr. Speaker, the following article by Mr. Jenkin Lloyd Jones appeared in the Washington Star of May 21.

The article is provocative and should encourage Members of Congress to take a very close look at the 47 pages of H.R. 10440:

ANTIPOVERTY BILL RUNS 47 PAGES—EVERYBODY TALKS ABOUT JOHNSON PLAN BUT FEW HAVE READ RESOLUTION 10440

Tolstoy's "War and Peace" is a classic that everybody talks about but that not many people have read. The same goes for House Resolution 10440, the bill under which President Johnson intends to wage his much-heralded "war on poverty."

The bill occupies 47 pages and like Venus it is surrounded by thick clouds of vapor and shines brightly. Among many other things, it seems to be a land reform measure unique in American history. Under its provisions American taxpayers will go far toward buying farms for people who think they would like to farm.

Section 302 provides for grants (i.e., gifts) of up to \$1,500 to low-income rural families for purchasing farms, reducing mortgages on existing farms, or "to finance nonagricultural enterprises which will enable such families to supplement their income."

There will also be offered 15-year loans of up to \$2,500 per family. This will be in addition to loans presently available under other Federal programs. But that's not all.

Section 303 calls for Federal assistance for "family farm development corporations." Such corporations will buy land, divide it into family-sized farms, build farm buildings, fences, etc., and sell it "at appraised value when used for agricultural purposes."

In many States "appraised value" for tax purposes runs 30 percent or less of actual value. But Uncle Sam will take care of that, too. For subsection (d) says: "The Director is authorized to make grants to such corporations in amounts sufficient to make up the deficiency between the cost of the farms and the net proceeds received from the sale of such farms."

What this all seems to mean is that while Citizen A, if he wants a farm, must make his own downpayment and borrow the rest at commercial rates, Citizen B, being deemed underprivileged, will get a Government gift of the downpayment, plus a loan, plus a sale price below cost.

With the Nation already suffering from a glut of farm produce, much of which must be purchased by the taxpayers to rot or be given away, it remains to be seen how much the national economy will be improved by creating thousands of new Government-subsidized family farms for the benefit of those who haven't been able to make the grade otherwise.

Section 411 on page 29 carries a curious proposal to make loans to employers who will agree to hire more men. It would lend up to \$10,000 multiplied by the number of new jobs. The new jobs are to be filled (the bill reads) by "persons not already employed by the borrower, a majority of whom will be recruited from among the long-term unemployed and members of low-income families."

This seems to mean that an employer wanting to build a \$100,000 plant can get his money at Treasury rates if he hires six jobless people at minimum wages and another four men away from some other employer.

If you like shotguns filled with fine bird-shot you might enjoy section 602 (k) and (l) as follows:

"The Director is authorized to, notwithstanding any other provision of law relating to the acquisition, handling, or disposal of real or personal property by the United States, deal with, complete, rent, renovate, modernize, or sell for cash or credit at his discretion any properties acquired by him in connection with loans, participations, and guarantees made by him pursuant to titles III (programs to combat poverty in rural areas) and IV (employment in investment incentives) of this act;

"To collect or compromise all obligations to or held by him and all legal or equitable rights accruing to him in connection with the payment of obligations until such obligations may be referred to the Attorney General for suit, or collection."

If this is the English language these passages exempt the Director from all existing laws governing the handling of U.S. property plus granting him the privilege of "compromising," i.e., forgiving, part or all of loans advanced in good faith by the U.S. Government until such time as these loans "may be," not "must be," referred to the Attorney General for collection.

What is this but carte blanche for a new Federal giveaway?"

There's a lot more in this bill, including the stirring windup on page 47, calling for an appropriation of \$962,500,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965 "and thereafter such sums as are necessary to carry out this act."

"War on Poverty." It's a terrific slogan, particularly in an election year. It puts doubters under the unenviable suspicion of being in favor of poverty.

But if you haven't read H.R. 10440 ask your Congressman for a copy. If you show enough interest maybe he'll read it—himself.

The Hill-Burton Program

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN E. FOGARTY

OF RHODE ISLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 25, 1964

Mr. FOGARTY. Mr. Speaker, as a graphic illustration of the manner in which the Hill-Burton program has been of direct, forceful aid to a State, I include a listing of all the hospital and medical facilities approved for my State of Rhode Island under the Hill-Burton program from the inception of the act in 1946 up to date.

Status	Location		Name of facility	Ownership	Category	Type of construction	Adjunct facility	Beds provided	Estimated cost		Initial approval
	County	City							Total	Federal share	
3	Providence	Cranston	Osteopathic General	1	1	2			\$575,870	\$153,080	June 1960.
3	do	do	Osteopathic General DTC	1	1	2	4	42	58,456	28,839	Do.
3	do	do	Osteopathic General	1	1	4			300,836	76,000	June 1952.
3	do	do	State Hospital	1	1	2			975,896	365,183	May 1955.
3	do	do	State Rehabilitation Center	1	1	2		150	174,545	87,273	June 1958.
3	do	East Providence	Emma Pend Bradley ASF	1	1	2	4		212,243	25,000	March 1960.
3	do	do	H. I. Chaffee Nursing Home	1	1	2			958,460	466,454	June 1953.
3	do	North Providence	Our Lady of Fatima	1	1	2		100	2,988,744	400,000	September 1959.
3	do	do	Our Lady of Fatima NH	1	1	2			3,292,126	300,000	June 1950.
3	do	Pawtucket	The Memorial	1	1	2	4	16	867,476	170,238	January 1955.
3	do	do	The Memorial ASF	1	1	2			58,278	23,311	June 1959.
3	do	do	The Memorial	1	1	2	4		504,418	201,767	May 1950.
3	do	do	Jane Brown Pav RI Hospital	1	1	2		8	504,441	50,000	December 1958.
3	do	do	Miriam Hospital DTC	1	1	2			1,006,423	402,778	April 1962.
3	do	do	Miriam Hospital	1	1	2			4,618,054	96,074	Do.
3	do	do	Miriam	1	1	2	4	110	1,715,358	670,143	December 1948.
3	do	do	Providence Lying In	1	1	2		69	1,693,128	514,607	June 1956.
3	do	do	Providence Lying In DTC	1	1	2			299,262	100,000	Do.
3	do	do	Rhode Island Hospital RF	1	1	2			82,804	28,869	June 1959.
3	do	do	EQ	1	1	2					
3	do	do	Rhode Island DTC EQ	1	1	2			200,000	100,000	June 1958.
3	do	do	Rhode Island Hospital NH	1	1	2	6		2,769,885	212,766	July 1962.
3	do	do	Rhode Island Hospital EQ	1	1	2			8,758,578	240,000	September 1955.
3	do	do	Rhode Island Hospital RF	1	1	2			3,947	1,473	June 1962.
3	do	do	EQ	1	1	2					
3	do	do	Rhode Island Hospital	1	1	2		32	571,237	235,741	June 1956.
3	do	do	Roger Williams General	1	1	2		50	1,002,055	240,673	June 1957.
3	do	do	Roger Williams General NH	1	1	2	6		635,062	60,008	September 1963.
3	do	do	Roger Williams General DTC	1	1	2			862,256	181,128	June 1957.
3	do	do	Roger Williams General ASF	1	1	2	4		107,882	39,833	October 1956.
3	do	do	Roger Williams General	1	1	2	4	48	975,937	390,374	February 1950.
3	do	do	St. Elizabeth Home ASF	1	1	2			95,294	41,449	December 1959.
3	do	do	do	1	1	2			217,818	93,651	December 1962.
3	do	do	St. Joseph Hospital	1	1	7	4	182	6,396,628	685,069	March 1962.
3	do	do	St. Joseph EQ	1	1	2			687,111	10,000	October 1954.
3	do	do	Woonsocket	1	1	2	4	39	252,190	100,159	August 1958.
3	do	do	Woonsocket Hospital	1	1	2	4	54	490,211	192,969	October 1961.
3	do	do	Woonsocket	1	1	2		8	1,128,307	280,704	December 1948.
3	do	Woonsocket	Ladd School Nursing Home	1	1	2	4	45	1,385,178	300,000	October 1960.
3	do	do	Ladd School Rehabilitation Center	1	1	2			675,699	112,956	June 1960.
3	do	do	South County Hospital	1	1	2	4	17	748,416	266,266	November 1960.
3	do	do	South County Hospital DTC	1	1	2			43,048	21,624	November 1960.
3	do	do	Westerly Hospital	1	1	2		82	1,897,417	180,000	October 1962.
3	do	do	Westerly Hospital DTC	1	1	2			889,259	118,724	April 1964.
3	Kent	Warwick	Kent County Memorial	1	1	2	4	120	1,876,804	664,731	January 1959.
3	do	do	do	1	1	2	1	100	1,244,364	431,742	December 1948.
3	do	do	Kent County Memorial DTC	1	1	2			887,683	168,841	January 1959.
3	do	do	Kent County Memorial ASF	1	1	2	4		170,664	68,181	August 1958.
3	Newport	Newport	Newport Hospital	1	1	2		26	956,153	76,000	March 1962.
3	do	do	Newport Hospital DTC	1	1	2			255,317	132,659	March 1962.
3	do	do	Newport ASF	1	1	2	4		86,400	16,360	April 1950.
3	do	do	Newport EQ	1	1	2	4		120,714	16,738	April 1949.

EXPLANATORY NOTES

The following defines the codes used in the following listing:

Status: The status of a project is indicated as follows:

- (1) Approved but not yet under construction.
- (2) Under construction.
- (3) In use.

Location: Locations are listed alphabetically by county within a State.

Name: The name used is that indicated by the project sponsor in the official application.

Ownership: The type of ownership is indicated as follows: (1) Voluntary nonprofit, (2) city, (3) county, (4) State, (5) special district, and (6) city-county.

Categories and authority for programs: The various categories, grouped by program authority under title VI of the Public Health Service Act, are indicated as follows: (1) General hospital, (2) tuberculosis hospital, (3) mental hospital, (4) chronic disease hospital, (5) public health center, (7) general hospital and public health center, and (8) State health department laboratory. Programs under part G: (G4) Chronic disease facility, (6) rehabilitation facility, (9) diagnostic or treatment center, and (9) nursing home.

Type of construction: The type of construction is indicated as follows: (1) New (2) addition, (3) remodeling, (4) replacement, (5) addition and remodeling, (6) addition and replacement, (7) addition, remodeling, and replacement, and (8) remodeling and replacement.

Adjunct facility: The adjunct facility being constructed is indicated as follows: (1) Laboratory, (2) nurses home, (3) outpatient department, (4) service facilities, (5) nurses home and service facilities, and (6) teaching or training facilities.

Beds provided: Indicates beds provided for patients by the project. Where no beds are listed the project is for equipment only (EQ); a health center (HC); rehabilitation facility (RF); diagnostic or treatment center (DTC); nurses home (NH); nurses school (NS); or adjunct service facilities (ASF). An asterisk (*) in the "beds provided" column indicates a project which includes other facilities as well as beds.

Estimated cost: Includes the estimated total project cost and the estimated amount of Federal participation. A project may be a total facility or part of a total facility.

Initial approval: Represents the month and year in which the initial project application was approved by the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service.

We Can Win in Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON

OF WYOMING

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 25, 1964

Mr. HARRISON. Mr. Speaker, in spite of official assurances from time to time that we will eventually start winning the war in Vietnam, it is apparent that we have been losing that struggle. Even now the administration is asking the Congress to approve the expenditure of additional millions in an effort to turn the tide in our favor.

While these additional funds will be of help, they are by no means the full or final answer to the problem.

I should like to call the attention of the Congress to a copyrighted article appearing in the Wyoming State Tribune in which Editor James Flinchum presents the views of Col. Wendell Fertig, retired, who is now the executive director of the Colorado School of Mines Alumni Association of Golden, Colo.

In World War II, Colonel Fertig organized and successfully carried out guerrilla warfare activity against the Japanese invaders in the Philippines, and thereby became one of our greatest authorities on guerrilla warfare.

As members will see, Colonel Fertig astutely assesses the problems we are up against in Vietnam, and he offers as a formula for victory what certainly appears to be an effective approach to them.

As Colonel Fertig says, "Money and equipment alone won't win this war."

Both Colonel Fertig and Editor Flinchum are to be congratulated for bringing this realistic approach to victory to the attention of the American people.

The article follows:

WE CAN WIN IN VIETNAM WITH GUERRILLA TACTICS

(By James M. Flinchum)

Can the United States and its southeast Asian allies ever hope to win the war against the Communists in South Vietnam?

If so, what is the formula for success in this costly, seemingly endless struggle that has been underway for years?

There is a hope for victory.

The United States and the South Vietnamese can triumph over the Red Vietcong politically and militarily—but only if the former recognize certain immutable facts, and then put into effect policies consistent with those facts.

The formula, a relatively simple one, comes from one of America's greatest authorities on guerrilla warfare, the type of combat that

is being waged right now by the Vietcong Communists against the South Vietnamese troops and our military advisers in the rain forests and swamps of the Mekong delta country.

The man who spells out this formula is a mining engineer who as a Reserve Army officer in 1942 refused to surrender to the Japanese forces in the Philippines and became the guerrilla leader ultimately of an Army of 35,000 American and Filipino troops who fought the invaders right up to the Japanese surrender in 1945.

The name of this man is Wendell Fertig, colonel, U.S. Army Reserve, retired, and now the executive director of the Colorado School of Mines Alumni Association at Golden, Colo.

For one reason or another, a considerable number of Americans did not surrender to the Japanese in the Philippines after the surrender at Bataan 22 years ago this month; most of them became guerrilla leaders, but of all who did, the name of Wendell Fertig, the mining engineer who left his job in 1941 to respond to a call to active duty as an officer in the Army Engineer Reserves, is the most famous.

Fertig ultimately wound up in the island of Mindanao, the largest of the Philippines, with the forces of Brig. Gen. William R. Sharp. When Sharp and his troops surrendered Fertig took off into the jungle. Eventually he found a core of resistance among Filipinos and Americans, organized it, and when the party got going full tilt, Fertig was the head man of a military and governmental setup that operated its own currency and postal system, had a navy of sorts, manufactured a crude radio that put them in touch with the mainland United States, and was fighting the Japanese to a standstill when the U.S. forces returned to the islands 3 years after the surrender.

The full story is set forth in a book published last year called "They Fought Alone," by John Keats.

As an expert on guerrilla warfare, then, Fertig ranks at the very top.

Since the war in South Vietnam is for us essentially a reverse of the situation in the Philippines from 1942 to 1945—with conventional military forces occupying key towns as the Japanese did, and sortieing forth from their strongholds in an effort to wipe out an enemy who fought according to no rules, who employed stealth, ambush, and all the weapons at the command of irregulars—it seemed that Fertig should be the man who would know how we should fight the Vietcong in the rice paddies, swamps, and rain forests of South Vietnam.

This is what Fertig told me in an interview:

First of all, we must instill in the South Vietnamese people the will to achieve victory in this war. This can be done through a variety of ways but we must make sure that their lassitude over this struggle that has been going on for nearly 16 years, is overcome.

One adverse situation, says Fertig, is that not enough U.S. aid in the form of supplies and other succor gets down to the people who really count—the peasants who live out in the countryside and who are the ones who could really stand to benefit from this aid.

This is essential to what Fertig regards as a basic requirement: That the South Vietnamese must win the war themselves; the United States never can put enough troops into that area, he says, to secure the victory for them if they lack the desire for victory.

At the same time, the United States itself must take control of the entire situation, says Fertig, warning that "you can't run one of these shows unless you actually take command." Fertig proved the soundness of this doctrine by seizing control of the guerrilla operation in Mindanao in 1942 against a Filipino factional leader who sought to use

him merely as a figurehead chief of staff. Fertig ended up being the No. 1 man.

Furthermore, we must recognize, says Fertig, that South Vietnam is a guerrilla-type operation staged in the jungles of southeast Asia where conventional-type weapons that work well in ordinary-type warfare are virtually useless.

The Vietcong, Fertig points out, use guerrilla tactics and we try to counter them with air attacks and forays with regular forces. This won't work.

There is only one way to defeat guerrilla forces in terrain of this type: by using counter guerrilla tactics.

So he suggests that this basic tactic be adopted: Organize a special corps of South Vietnamese guerrilla warfare specialists, equip them with the necessities but no more, and send them into the field to fight the Vietcong with the same hit and run shadowy tactics that the latter favors now. But follow these special counterinsurgency forces with regular troops to be used only as a holding force. As the villages and rural areas are cleaned out of the Vietcong and the latter are either eliminated or forced back, secure the terrain with the regular troops.

The latter, says Fertig, can be used as goodwill ambassadors, making sure that they are just that and not pillagers and rapists. They can pass out candy to the children and chuck old ladies under the chin; they also can prevent a return of the enemy, while ahead of them moves the real combat forces—the counter guerrillas.

There is nothing new in this; the late President Ramon Magsaysay of the Philippines successfully used the same tactics in overcoming the very same type of politico-military problem against the Communist Hukbalahaps.

"The only successful counter guerrilla tactics in history have been those that employed the same methods of the guerrillas themselves," says Fertig.

In carrying out this program, however, the U.S.-South Vietnamese leadership must also recognize an axiom of guerrilla warfare: Never oversupply a guerrilla force. Photographs of South Vietnamese troops operating in the field against the Vietcong make Fertig wince. They are shown wearing U.S. G.I. steel helmets, full field packs and all of the standard infantryman accoutrements while the Vietcong are a barefoot rabble clad in shorts.

Too much equipment destroys the mobility of a guerrilla force and permits it to be pinned down by attackers; "any time a guerrilla is pinned down," observes Fertig, "he is defeated."

Development of the people in the countryside into willing allies will provide another benefit; this is information of the enemy's movements which Fertig calls "G-2 from the people to you." The forces attacking the Vietcong are blind unless they can be kept informed on the latter's every move; contrariwise, news about one's own movements or plans must be sternly denied to the enemy.

When Magsaysay moved against the Hukbalahaps, says Fertig, he organized six special companies under Col. Napoleon Valeriano and sent them into the field with the regular army following along behind.

But more than a reversal of tactical policy is necessary in southeast Asia, in Fertig's opinion. This Nation to secure victory is going to have to abandon its "no win" concept of warfare if we hope to achieve a decision; and furthermore, we are going to have to get tough with North Vietnam and other countries that actively supply the Vietcong.

"Tell the North Vietnamese," says Fertig, "they must curtail their support of the Vietcong, and make it plain to them that if they don't we shall consider it a hostile act. And then if the Red Chinese replace North Viet-

nam as the primary source of supply, take the same action with them."

Fertig also thinks this country must stop worrying about whether other countries will develop a poor opinion of us as in the case of Cuba where, he says, "we were afraid of what the U.N. or the South Americans might think if we acted against Castro."

"You can't be a great power," he says, "and be loved. The rest of the world is going to hate your guts," adding: "I just can't feel it is necessary for us to justify our action against Castro, for example, to Guadeloupe in the Caribbean."

"This all adds up to the fact that we are sending our young men to fight a war which we say is not a war," says Fertig, "and yet they are expected to defeat an enemy who will use any tactics in the world including terror and sabotage."

There is just one other thing to remember, says Fertig, who once waged a war against absolutely incredible odds with only guts, a driving determination and chopped-up curtain rods for bullets: "Money and equipment alone won't win this war."

Mess in Southeast Asia

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. RALPH HARVEY

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, May 25, 1964

Mr. HARVEY of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following editorial from the Richmond (Ind.) Polladium-Item:

MESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Where are we going, and what are we getting into in southeast Asia?

Do President Johnson, Defense Secretary McNamara, or Secretary of State Rusk have the slightest idea?

Our involvement in South Vietnam, for example, is costing us about \$400 million a year. That is nearly half a billion dollars. The other day President Johnson proposed an extra \$125 million to finance additional military and civil operations in South Vietnam.

How long is that supposed to last? It can't be for long, at the rate we are going. Then will there have to be more?

Apparently President Johnson and his advisers have long since given up on the idea of getting our troops out of Vietnam by the end of 1965. In fact, McNamara recently returned with the gloomily outlook that a long road is ahead. He says we can win, with "persistent" efforts.

Incidentally, what will we have to do before we can decide we have won? What, exactly, are our goals?

Protests over our policy in South Vietnam, whatever it is, are beginning to mount in the Congress.

Senator WAYNE MORSE, an Oregon Democrat who has been a persistent foe of our involvement in South Vietnam, wonders if President Johnson's call for additional funds in Vietnam is nothing but a subterfuge to enable the administration to carry on a war without the Congress ever declaring war.

Remember President Truman's "police action" in Korea? That never was declared a war. Unfortunately, those American boys who gave their lives in Korea, and who now are dying as "instructors" and "advisers" in Vietnam are as dead as those killed in declared wars.

From Senator KARL E. MUNDT, a South Dakota Republican, has come another suggestion. He wants someone other than Secretary McNamara to conduct a fact-finding trip to South Vietnam. Senator MUNDT, too, wants to know what we are doing, and what our goal is in respect with the war in that country.

On top of our troubles in Vietnam is news now that the Communists are on the march again in nearby Laos, which was supposed to have been "neutralized."

What we are doing about that borders on the ridiculous.

Reports from Washington are that we are making approaches to Red China to help preserve the neutrality of Laos. And Great Britain has asked the same thing, not only of Red China but also of Soviet Russia.

How in the name of sense can our country and Great Britain have even the slightest hope that Red China or Soviet Russia will do anything to save the hides of the free world? Their object is to conquer us, not to help us.

Russia already has called the proposed additional \$125 million proposed for use in Vietnam as "extending aggression and bloodshed."

We are getting in deeper every day. The more we flounder the worse it gets. What soft-headed fools the Communists must take us for.

Admiral McDonald Writes of Navy's Tasks

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. CRAIG HOSMER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 25, 1964

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. David McDonald, U.S. Navy, writing in the June edition of the Officer magazine gives insight to today's vital tasks which must be discharged by the Navy in the following excellent article:

THE NAVY: TODAY AND TOMORROW

(By Adm. David McDonald, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations)

One of the rewarding aspects of being Chief of Naval Operations has been the opportunity to become more personally familiar with the Naval Reserve program than was possible for me during my recent years of mainly overseas duty. On Washington's Birthday, for instance, I spoke to the Reserve Officers Association in Atlanta and visited the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Training Center there. The following week, I attended the annual midwinter banquet of the ROA here in Washington. On these occasions and others like them, I have been greatly impressed by the caliber, interest, and enthusiasm of the people I have met and talked with, and I look forward with pleasure to a continued close association with the members of our Naval Reserve.

I did not have to be convinced, of course, of the imperative need for strong and ready Reserve forces. Every officer—not only of my own service but of our sister services as well—knows how essential the Reserve is. I have seen this demonstrated many times, both as Chief of Naval Operations and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which position I have studied many of the problems and needs of the Army and Air Force as well as the Navy.

Great danger continues to face our country. Powerful forces would like to see our

form of government go down, and although their efforts to undermine our Government and those of the world's other democracies have not (for many years) brought about a major war, the continued fighting in Vietnam and tension in Berlin—to give only two examples—indicate that the threat is still there. It will be there, I am afraid, for many, many years to come. If we had to counter it by maintaining on active duty all the forces which would be needed for each of our services to engage in actual war, the cost to our country would be fantastic. In fact, I would have some very serious doubts as to whether our economy, vital as it is, could stand the strain. It is you in the Reserves who enable us to "have our cake and eat it, too." Because of the sacrifices of time and energy you make, we need keep on active duty only the forces required to deal with our current responsibilities and the more likely contingencies, having, in you, great residual strength to be called upon if we need it. We have done that, as most of you know, as recently as the Berlin crisis of 1961, when 40 Reserve ships and 18 Reserve patrol squadrons returned to active duty.

I should like to give you who are our back-up team a little idea of the Navy's present numbers and capabilities, discuss some of the problems and projects currently of particular interest, and then take a few looks into my crystal ball and hazard a few guesses as to where we are going in the future.

NEW METHODS, OLD JOB

By the end of this fiscal year, we expect to have 873 ships in our active fleet, with another 114 under construction. We will have 7,087 operating aircraft, 669,992 personnel in uniform, and an additional 340,000 civilians. Last year, our budget was \$15 billion. That's a lot of money, a lot of people, a lot of hardware. What are we doing with it? The answer is pretty simple: we're doing what we've always done—seeing that the seas remain free, that the ships of all nations can move on them in peaceful trade. Additionally, we are showing the flag at ports around the world, keeping ourselves ready through fleet exercises and joint exercises with other navies for whatever actions we may be called upon to take. There are also some new facets to the role we play in the defense of the United States. For instance, our Polaris submarines have taken their place as a major part of America's nuclear deterrent, and we are exploring the possibilities of a multilateral force with our NATO allies. These, however, are in a way, simply modern ways to help accomplish a centuries-old job.

We are not without our problems, of course—none of the services are. One of the most absorbing and challenging of these, at the moment, is the study of how much and how quickly the Navy should convert to nuclear propulsion. There is pretty general agreement that submarines should be nuclear-propelled, for this modern method of propulsion makes a spectacular difference in underwater craft, enabling them to go without surfacing for weeks—almost, literally, as long as their food and other stores hold out.

NUCLEAR SHIPS FORESEEN

In regard to nuclear power for surface ships, however, there continues to be a good deal of honest difference of opinion, and this is something I think we'll be talking over for many years to come. I believe, however, that eventually a large part of our surface ships will also be nuclear-powered, especially as our scientists and technicians bring down costs and reduce the physical size of powerplants. Nuclear power represents (in my opinion) the greatest advance in propulsion since the change from sail to steam—far greater than the improvements brought about by the change from coal to oil. At present, of course, it is only practical for our largest surface ships, and even for those, as

you will have read, there is disagreement as to whether the advantages justify the cost. The military advantages are very evident and, I believe, universally accepted. Nobody's denying, either, that this method of propulsion is expensive. The question is—and for at least the immediate future will continue to be—twofold: (a) are these advantages essential, and (b) are they worth the price?

Our present thinking is that, long range, we want nuclear propulsion for all submarines and for all surface ships where it would give a definite military advantage and where it is technically and economically feasible. Short range, we hope to complete an entirely nuclear task force built around *Enterprise* as soon as possible, and to build a second such task force as soon thereafter as we can.

PERSONNEL PROBLEMS REMAIN

I do not mean, of course, that we have any idea of junking all our ships that are not nuclear powered. Far from it. The experience we have already had of running nuclear and nonnuclear ships together in the same task force shows that this can be done effectively and that these mixed groups have a capability superior to that of a conventionally-powered group. We will, however, on a gradual, planned basis, replace our older ships with new ships, an increasing number of which will be nuclear powered. For many, many years to come, we will be steaming mixed groups of nuclear and non-nuclear ships, and in many of our smaller ships, of course, nuclear power may never be considered practical.

Among other matters much discussed in the Navy at the moment is our continuing difficulty in retaining personnel beyond the period of their obligated service. Many leave the service because they are offered better-paying jobs in industry. We have succeeded in improving the situation in regard to pay and a number of the other factors which influence morale, such as adequate housing, but much more must still be done.

Antisubmarine warfare continues to be a tough, demanding task, requiring our best efforts. We are gaining, improving our techniques not just in individual units, but in the coordinated tactics among the members of our air-surface-subsurface ASW teams. ASW, however, continues to be one of our most challenging problems.

I certainly do not mean to imply, however, that I think the Navy is in trouble. What you are trying to improve always comes to mind more quickly than the things you are satisfied with. I am glad to say that I am pretty happy about the present condition of the Navy—not only our capabilities, but the way we are organized, the plans we have made, the people we have on board. I think we can face the future with confidence, knowing that any challenges we may face will be forthrightly met and conquered.

That we will keep on doing so is my first prediction—we will continue, I believe, to perform with efficiency and distinction the tasks allotted us. My second prediction is that we will not find that these tasks have become any fewer. Castro has shown that he means to keep Guantanamo in the forefront of world attention. In Vietnam, the stabilizing effect of a U.S. naval force standing off those troubled shores may at any moment be required. At any time, we may be called upon to respond to some threat, or, very possibly, several threats at once.

Whether the threat is thermonuclear war, non-nuclear general war, limited war, or the brush-fire border disputes and civil insurrections so common to the cold war, our forces can counter quickly, using the precise degree of force the situation seems to call for—and our potential enemies know of our capabilities and know, too, that we are determined to use them if we must.

We can take action without alerting anyone or asking their permission. We simply